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ABSTRACT 
 
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT AND REPORTING INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE FROM 
SEC BUDGET ALLOCATIONS 
 
Terrence Patrick Blackburne 
Wayne Guay 
Luzi Hail 
 
This study examines the determinants and consequences of regulatory oversight of 
corporate disclosures. I investigate the extent to which industry-level political activity 
influences the intensity of regulatory oversight, and whether variation in the intensity of 
oversight affects managers’ reporting incentives. I exploit variation in the allocation of 
budgetary resources between the SEC’s disclosure review offices as a source of variation 
in the oversight of financial reporting and disclosures. I find evidence of a significant 
relationship between industry-level political activity and visibility and the allocation of 
resources to each office. I then use the amount of budgetary resources allocated to each 
office as a proxy for the intensity of the SEC oversight that firms in a given industry face. 
I provide evidence that when SEC oversight is more intense managers report lower 
discretionary accruals, managers are less likely to issue financial reports that will be 
subsequently restated, and firms’ bid-ask spreads decrease. Overall, the results suggest 
that SEC oversight plays an important role in shaping managers’ reporting and disclosure 
incentives. 
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1. Introduction 
Both academics and practitioners have long debated the effectiveness of 
regulatory oversight on corporate behavior. Economists theorize that the political process 
leads to the capture of regulatory bodies by the firms they oversee, thus limiting 
regulation’s effectiveness (e.g. Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976).  This skepticism 
concerning the general effectiveness of regulatory oversight has extended to debates 
regarding whether oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) affects 
managers’ reporting and disclosure choices (e.g. Stigler 1964; Benston 1969; Seligman 
2003; Bushee and Leuz 2005).  Since its inception, the SEC has reviewed corporate 
disclosure filings to ensure their compliance with mandatory reporting and disclosure 
regulations (Seligman 2003). If it finds deficiencies in a firm’s disclosure filing, the SEC 
may require the firm to amend the filing or restate its financial reports (Johnston and 
Petacchi 2013). This study contributes to the debate on the SEC’s effectiveness by 
examining two questions related to its filing review process. First, to what extend do 
industry-level political factors affect the allocation of resources that the SEC devotes to 
reviewing corporate disclosures? And, second, does variation in the intensity of SEC 
oversight affect managers’ reporting and disclosure choices?  
Researchers have generally acknowledged that limited budgetary and staffing 
resources constrain the SEC’s activities (e.g. Pincus et al. 1988; Cox et al. 2003; Jackson 
and Roe 2009; Kedia and Rajgopal 2011). Several recent studies have used aggregate 
regulatory resources as input-based measures of oversight intensity (Coffee 2007; 
Jackson and Roe 2009; Christensen et al. 2011; Del Guercio et al. 2013). But, theoretical 
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arguments suggest that country-level economic shocks could affect both the aggregate 
amount of resources allocated to regulatory oversight and disclosure outcomes (Bertomeu 
and Magee 2011), which raises concerns that cross-country empirical studies may omit 
key macroeconomic variables from their analyses. By examining a source of within-
country variation in regulatory oversight, this study overcomes some of the challenges 
that cannot be addressed in a cross-country setting.  
I attempt to look inside the “black box” by evaluating the SEC’s reporting 
oversight activities directly. I use a novel panel dataset, obtained through request from 
the SEC, consisting of budget and staffing allocations for each disclosure review office 
within the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance. These offices provide a powerful 
setting for investigating factors that influence the intensity of SEC oversight and how its 
intensity affects managers’ financial reporting incentives.  The disclosure review offices 
are organized by industry and are established to ensure that information is disseminated 
to capital market participants. Therefore, their budget and staffing allocations do not 
reflect SEC activities related to other regulatory activities. The disclosure review offices 
carry out their mandate by reviewing the adequacy of firms’ SEC filings and by helping 
firms interpret disclosure rules. Because firms are assigned to a disclosure review office 
on the basis of their four-digit SIC code, managers know in advance what office will 
review their firm’s filings. Moreover, Johnston and Petacchi (2013) note that a substantial 
portion of the comment letters issued by these offices lead to amended filings. In 
addition, periodic filing reviews are a major source of leads that result in eventual SEC 
enforcement actions (Feroz et al. 1991). I exploit variation in the allocation of budgetary 
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resources and workload between the disclosure review offices to construct a proxy of the 
intensity SEC’s oversight of financial reporting and disclosures. 
Regulatory budget allocations are an outcome of the political process. Economists 
have long argued that frictions in the political process result in the formation of interest 
groups that wield disproportionate influence over political outcomes (Stigler 1971; 
Peltzman 1976; Becker 1983). Therefore, I hypothesize that interest-group politics affect 
the allocation of resources between the SEC’s disclosure review offices. I measure 
industry-level political activity as the average number of contributions made by firms in 
an industry to the congressional campaigns of candidates with a committee or 
subcommittee assignment relevant to the SEC. This is because Congress is the ultimate 
source of budgetary resources for bureaucratic entities within the United States, and 
members of Congress with relevant committee and subcommittee assignments wield 
disproportionate power over the regulatory bodies they oversee (Weingast and Moran 
1983). I use the 2008 financial crisis as a shock to political visibility that likely shifted 
political power from financial services firms to investors. Consistent with the theory, I 
find evidence that the intensity of SEC oversight over corporate disclosures is associated 
with industry-level political contributions and political visibility. Specifically, I find 
statistically significant evidence that a one candidate increase in the number of political 
candidates supported per firm in a given industry is associated with a 56 to 208 thousand 
dollar decrease in the budgets allocated to review that industry’s mandatory disclosure 
filings. Moreover, I document a substantial increase in the budgetary resources allocated 
to oversee disclosure filings made by firms in the financial services industry following 
the financial crisis. 
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Next, I exploit the SEC’s organizational structure and features of the federal 
budget process to empirically test whether variation in SEC oversight capacity affects 
managers’ reporting and disclosure incentives. I measure SEC oversight capacity as 
dollars per megabyte of mandatory disclosure filings and use this measure as a proxy for 
the intensity of SEC oversight. Theory suggests that if managers rationally anticipate the 
intensity of SEC oversight then it should affect their reporting choices (e.g. Fischer and 
Verrecchia 2000). Because SEC resources are allocated before managers make their 
reporting and disclosure choices, I test whether the intensity of SEC oversight affects 
managers’ reporting and disclosure outcomes. I use five proxies for managers’ reporting 
and disclosure outcomes: discretionary accruals, the incidence of accounting 
restatements, the incidence of fraudulent disclosures, bid-ask spreads, and the market 
premium for illiquidity. I find evidence that, when SEC oversight is more intense, 
managers report lower discretionary accruals. Moreover, they are significantly less likely 
to issue financial reports that are subsequently restated or make fraudulent disclosures. In 
addition, I find evidence that SEC oversight has significant capital market benefits. My 
findings suggest that a one standard deviation increase in my proxy for the intensity of 
SEC oversight results in a 2.5 to 8.8 percent decrease in the mean firm’s bid-ask spread 
and a 14.2 to 25.6 percent reduction in its illiquidity premium.   
I conduct additional tests to assess whether the effect of SEC oversight on 
managers’ reporting incentives varies with changes in the political environment. I draw 
upon the political cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 1978, 1986) and argue that 
politically active firms engage in the political process to reduce political costs. If 
politically active firms have “captured” the regulatory process, then changes in SEC 
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oversight capacity should have a smaller effect on their reporting incentives than for non-
politically active firms (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976). I fail to find evidence that SEC 
oversight has a consistent differential effect on politically active firms’ reporting and 
disclosure outcomes.  This suggests that the effects of corporate political activity on SEC 
oversight may be an unintended consequence of efforts to influence other regulatory 
processes. In addition, I use the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent 
financial crisis as an inter-temporal shock that likely shifted the balance of political 
power from firms to investors. Consistent with theory that suggests such an event would 
increase demand for regulatory oversight, I find weak evidence that managers’ reporting 
choices are more responsive to SEC oversight during the time period after the Lehman 
Brothers collapse.  
My study makes several contributions that should be of interest to academics and 
practitioners. First, it contributes to the nascent literature examining the SEC’s filing 
review process. These studies have investigated characteristics that are common to firms 
that receive SEC comment letters (Cassell et al. 2013, Johnston and Petacchi 2013) or 
determinants of compliance with specific disclosure requirements (Robinson et al. 2011). 
A common feature of these studies is that they rely on ex post indicators of SEC scrutiny, 
which are a joint function of SEC oversight and managers’ behavior. An increase in 
observed outputs could be the result of either increased activity on the part of the 
regulator, or reduced compliance with regulatory requirements on the part of managers. 
Therefore, these studies are constrained in their ability to provide insight into the effects 
of SEC scrutiny on managers’ strategic reporting choices. I provide evidence that 
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managers’ strategically adjust their reporting and disclosure behavior in response to 
changes in the intensity of SEC oversight. 
Second, my study provides insight into the literature that examines the relation 
between corporate political activity and financial reporting quality. Prior research finds 
that more politically active firms face lower enforcement penalties and evade detection 
for longer periods when they misreport financial information (Correia 2009; Yu and Yu 
2011). I find evidence of a possible mechanism for these findings; namely, the SEC 
devotes fewer budgetary resources to detect misreporting when firms are more politically 
active. The evidence suggests, however, that this results from a rational response by the 
SEC to increased costs of enforcement rather than managers obtaining a quid pro quo 
from their political activity.  
Third, I contribute to the literature that examines the consequences of oversight 
by securities regulators on managers’ reporting decisions. The literature in this area 
produces mixed results. Several studies suggest that enforcement is necessary for 
securities regulations to have any capital market effects (Bhattacharya 2002; Christensen 
et al. 2011; Christensen et al. 2013). However, prior research also finds that the SEC only 
uncovers a relatively small portion of the frauds that are eventually discovered (Dyck et 
al. 2010; Dyck et al. 2013). Because studies that use output-based measures of oversight 
intensity omit regulatory efforts to deter non-compliant behavior, an emerging literature 
uses input-based measures to identify variation in the intensity of regulatory oversight 
(Coffee 2007; Jackson and Roe 2009; Kedia and Rajgopal 2011; Hanlon et al. 2012; Del 
Guercio et al. 2013). My results suggest that the intensity of SEC disclosure monitoring 
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likely plays a role in deterring fraudulent reporting, which could explain the small portion 
of frauds that the SEC discovers. 
Finally, my study contributes to a large literature in accounting that concludes that 
reporting outcomes are a function of managers’ reporting incentives. Prior research in 
this area has shown that properties of financial reporting vary with legal institutions, 
listing status, governance structure, and contracting incentives related to debt and 
compensation (e.g. Ball et al. 2000; Beatty and Weber 2003; Bushman et al. 2004; Ball 
and Shivakumar 2005; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Armstrong et al. 2013). My results 
suggest that regulatory oversight provides an additional monitoring mechanism that 
affects managers’ incentives when they make their reporting and disclosure choices.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides 
institutional details regarding the SEC’s oversight of firms’ financial reporting and 
mandatory disclosure filings. Section 3 provides a review of the relevant literature and 
outlines my hypotheses. Section 4 provides a description of the data.  I present the results 
of my analyses in Section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
2.    Institutional Background 
In the United States, the SEC is responsible for enforcing securities regulations, 
including those related to mandatory disclosure filings and financial reporting. One tool 
that the SEC uses to enforce compliance with disclosure regulations is its filing review 
process. The SEC monitors firms’ compliance with disclosure regulations by reviewing a 
subset of all corporate disclosure filings. The Sarbanes Oxley Act requires the SEC to 
conduct a review of a firm’s financial statements at least once every three years. In 
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addition, the SEC selectively reviews firms’ filings when it believes they are likely to be 
deficient.  If it identifies deficiencies in a firm’s filings the SEC sends the firm a 
comment letter, which may seek clarification, require additional disclosures, or direct the 
firm to amend the filing. 
Within the SEC, the Division of Corporation Finance (DCF) is responsible for 
overseeing compliance with corporate disclosure regulations. The DCF, in turn, has 
twelve Disclosure Operations Offices that implement the filing review process1. These 
offices are organized based on industry; firms are assigned to a Disclosure Review Office 
based on their four-digit SIC code2. Under certain circumstances a firm’s filing may be 
reviewed by a different office, such as when the filing is associated with a transaction that 
pertains to another office’s area of expertise or if the Division is conducting targeted 
reviews of specific disclosure items. But, in general, each office’s ability to review filings 
made by firms assigned to a different office is limited because their staffs maintain 
specific industry expertise. 
The filing review process consists of four phases (GAO 2013). During the 
screening phase examiners use the selection criteria developed at the beginning of the 
fiscal year to determine the review’s scope. Once the scope of the review is determined, 
filings enter the examination phase, where examiners evaluate whether the information 
under review in a filing is compliant with applicable regulations. If SEC examiners 
identify any deficiencies in a filing then they will propose comments soliciting 
information to correct them. The next step in the process is the closing of the filing 
                                                           
1
 During the sample period I examine the Division maintained eleven Disclosure Operations Offices.  
2
 Broad industry areas are presented in table 1. Current office assignments can be viewed at 
http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm. 
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review. During this phase examiners prepare a closing memorandum that documents the 
results of the review. The final phase in the process is the public posting of any SEC 
comments and firms’ responses to them on the SEC’s website. 
 The scope of filing reviews varies between full cover-to-cover reviews, where 
every aspect of a filing is reviewed in detail for compliance with SEC regulations, to 
targeted reviews where the DCF staff examines a single disclosure item. At the beginning 
of each fiscal year, when overall budgetary resources are known, DCF managers develop 
goals related to the number and scope of filing reviews; in addition, they suggest criteria 
that the Disclosure Operations Offices should use to identify firms subject to selective 
reviews (GAO 2013). The filing review process is labor-intensive. Typically, two 
members of the DCF staff review a selected filing to ensure consistency across all 
reviews. Budgetary limitations constrain both the quantity and scope of filing reviews 
that the SEC is able to undertake during any given period. Differences between office-
level budget allocations thus result in both cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in 
the intensity of SEC monitoring faced by firms.   
 The SEC offsets the costs of its operations with the fees it collects from firms 
subject to its oversight. However, unlike banking regulators, the SEC must obtain annual 
appropriations from Congress before it can access these funds. The SEC prepares its 
request for budgetary resources more than a year before they are ultimately implemented 
(Bealing 1994). In this sense, the budget allocation is exogenous with respect to 
unanticipated events that occur in the year it is being implemented. The staff first 
prepares an SEC-wide budget based on the prior year’s appropriations that conforms to 
guidelines provided by the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The 
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budget staff then requests information on staffing requirements at the division and office 
level. Division and office officials report that requests for additional resources must be 
consistent with OMB guidance and thus do not necessarily reflect actual requirements 
(GAO 2002).  
The SEC submits its initial fiscal year budget request to OMB roughly one year 
before the fiscal year start. Figure 1 contains a timeline of the federal budget process. 
While the budget request is under OMB review, the SEC has an opportunity to amend the 
overall request due to changes in policy. After OMB reviews and approves the SEC’s 
request, the White House transmits it to Congress along with the overall President’s 
Budget Request. Congress conducts budget hearings and provides the SEC with an 
annual appropriation at the beginning of every federal fiscal year3. Unlike most 
appropriations, which are only available for one year, SEC appropriations are available 
until they are expended. But, Congress typically rescinds any remaining balances at the 
end of the fiscal year. 
The allocation of budgetary resources for the upcoming fiscal year is publically 
observable at the division-level once Congress passes an appropriations bill.  However, 
cross-sectional variation in office-level budget allocations are not directly observable. 
Nonetheless, there are avenues through which managers may infer them indirectly.  First, 
in addition to reviewing firms’ SEC filings, the DCF also provides firms with interpretive 
guidance about disclosure regulations. Therefore, SEC staff have frequent interactions 
with firms’ management, auditors, and legal counsel. Although the SEC is unwilling to 
                                                           
3
 Each federal fiscal year ends on September 30 of that year. For example, fiscal year 2012 began on 
October 1, 2011 and ended on September 30, 2012. 
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disclose details regarding internal procedures, managers may be able to infer the extent of 
resource constraints faced by SEC staff based on their responsiveness to both formal and 
informal inquiries. Second, new job postings are publically available through the Office 
of Personnel Management, which makes it possible to estimate changes in office staffing 
levels; managers can easily obtain information about staff changes within a given 
disclosure review office.4 Finally, many firms retain outside legal counsel with 
experience as SEC staff to assist with SEC filing compliance (DeHaan et al. 2012).5  
The SEC has some ability to reallocate resources internally during each fiscal 
year, but institutional frictions limit it its ability to do so. First, if the SEC wishes to 
reallocate budgetary resources in response to changing economic circumstances beyond 
an authorized threshold it must submit a reprogramming request to the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees for their approval6. Second, because disclosure review staff 
have specialized industry expertise, their ability to assist other offices is limited. Staff do 
shift into other offices when opportunities arise. But, these moves are typically 
accompanied with increases in pay and are long-term. Thus, it does not appear that the 
SEC has flexibility in its staffing to adjust to rapid-changing market demands. The SEC 
faces the challenge of anticipating which set of firms are most likely to issue deficient 
filings, and hence where the demand for monitoring intensity is highest, more than a year 
before the managers of these firms make their disclosure choices.  
                                                           
4
 See, for example, http://www.rrdonnelley.com/_documents/industry-solutions/financial_services/1-
New_SEC_Developments.pdf 
5
 In addition, numerous law firms specializing in SEC compliance issues advertise the experience of their 
staff as former SEC officials. See, for example, http://www.andrewskurth.com/practices-
Corporate_Compliance_Investigations_Defense.html 
6
 The threshold varies from year to year, but is typically set at the lessor of one million dollars or ten 
percent of the activity’s budget. 
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3.  Hypothesis Development and Literature Review 
 I examine whether the intensity of SEC oversight affects managers’ reporting and 
disclosure choices. Before examining any effects, however, it is useful to consider factors 
that may shape the SEC’s oversight behavior. 
3.1 Theories of Regulatory Behavior 
 A large body of literature in economics and political science seeks to explain the 
determinants of regulatory behavior.7 Laffont and Tirole (1991) classify the dominant 
theories in this literature into two broad groups: “public interest” theories and “interest 
group” theories. “Public interest” theories typically take the perspective that regulatory 
agencies take actions to maximize social welfare. They posit that governments 
promulgate regulations to mitigate losses in welfare caused by perceived market failures 
(Shleifer 2005). In contrast, “interest group” theories view regulators as self-interested 
utility maximizers. Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), and Becker (1983) provide a 
foundation for this second set of theories. They argue that small interest groups are able 
to form coalitions more effectively than the general electorate when regulations will 
impose disproportionate marginal costs (or marginal benefits) on them. These coalitions 
are able to “capture” regulatory agencies and distort policy to maximize their interests 
rather than social welfare. 
 Weingast and Moran (1983) propose a “congressional dominance” extension to 
the early “interest group” theories by examining the role of the legislature in the 
regulatory process. They note that Congress both exercises oversight over regulatory 
                                                           
7
 For an extensive review of the literature in this area, see Mueller, 2003. 
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agencies and allocates budgetary resources to those agencies that provide its members 
with the greatest marginal political benefits. Members of Congress seek membership on 
the oversight committees that provide them with the greatest political benefits, given their 
constituencies, and are therefore likely to be informed about issues affecting the agencies 
they oversee. They argue that political institutions have evolved such that interest groups 
affect regulatory behavior via their influence over Congress. Weingast (1984) applies the 
congressional dominance theory to investigate empirically behavior by the SEC and finds 
evidence that the SEC’s success at implementing policy changes is dependent on their 
alignment with congressional preferences. He further finds evidence that Congress 
rewards the SEC with larger budget allocations when it is more politically valuable.  
The “interest group” theories outlined above suggest that corporate political 
contributions to congressional candidates are likely to affect the SEC’s oversight 
activities. The political cost hypothesis, developed by Watts and Zimmerman (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1978), proposes that firms will make political contributions and accounting 
choices to minimize wealth transfers created by the political process. Consistent with this, 
Yu and Yu (2011) find evidence that corporate lobbying is associated with delayed fraud 
detection and a lower probability that fraud will be detected by regulators. Moreover, 
they find that firms increase lobbying activity following the initiation of the fraud. 
Correia (2009) finds similar patterns with corporate contributions to political campaigns 
and accounting quality. Thus, the extant empirical evidence suggests that firms use 
expenses on political activity to reduce the costs of misreporting. 
However, prior empirical research has generally failed to document substantial 
links between political contributions and congressional voting behavior (Ansolabehere, 
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deFigueiredo and Snyder 2003). If political contributions have little effect on 
congressional voting outcomes, then it is unclear whether and how firms use them to 
affect regulatory agencies’ behavior. Given the lack of strong empirical associations 
between contributions and congressional voting, it is conceivable that political 
contributions are merely a consumption good. Corporate political contributions may 
simply be perquisites consumed by managers rather than expenditures made by firms to 
minimize political costs, and thus be a manifestation of unresolved agency problems 
within a firm.  
Gordon and Hafer (2005) propose an alternative to theories of regulatory capture. 
They argue that corporate contributions to congressional campaigns need not affect 
congressional voting behavior to affect the behavior of regulatory agencies. They argue 
that political contributions serve as a signal of firms’ willingness and ability to impose 
political costs on the agencies that regulate them. Under this signaling hypothesis 
regulatory agencies will devote fewer resources to detect infractions committed by 
politically active firms because pursuing enforcement actions against them is more costly 
to the regulator than pursuing enforcement actions against non-politically active firms. A 
key corollary to the signaling hypothesis is that it implies firms’ political activity will 
have an effect on all regulatory bodies that oversee them. Thus, a firm’s engagement in 
the political process that is intended to reduce oversight by a regulator such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency may have the unintended consequence of affecting 
activity at the SEC. Moreover, regulators need not observe the political contributions 
directly if they are correlated with other behavior that the regulator does observe, such as 
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inquiries from congressional staff or changes in firms’ aggressiveness during regular 
interactions.  
Prior research suggests the SEC is quite sensitive to potential costs when it 
decides whether to pursue an enforcement action; and—because of resource constraints—
that the SEC only pursues cases when it believes it has a high probability of obtaining a 
successful outcome (Cox, Thomas and Kiku 2003). If political costs affect the intensity 
SEC oversight, then one would expect the SEC to devote fewer budgetary resources to 
oversee the filings of firms in industries that are politically active. However, the political 
cost hypothesis and prior empirical evidence suggests that firms that misreport 
accounting information are likely to increase their political activity. Therefore, if 
increases in political activity signal a higher probability of reporting deficiencies, it is 
conceivable that the SEC would increase the allocation of budgetary resources to these 
industries. I formally state the first hypothesis below (in the null form): 
H1: Political activity and visibility do not affect the allocation of resources between 
the SEC’s disclosure review offices. 
3.2 SEC Oversight and Managers’ Reporting Incentives 
 Does the intensity of SEC oversight affect managers’ reporting and disclosure 
behavior? Economic theory suggests that more intense SEC oversight should increase ex 
ante compliance with mandatory reporting and disclosure regulations if it increases the 
probability that non-compliance is detected (Becker 1968). Because monitoring and 
enforcement are costly activities, the intensity of regulatory oversight depends on the 
amount of budgetary resources devoted to it (Stigler 1970). Prior research suggests that 
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budgetary resources constrain the SEC’s oversight activities (Cox, Thomas and Kiku 
2003; Kedia and Rajgopal 2011). The allocation of budgetary resources within the SEC is 
thus a source of revealed oversight priorities given overall constraints. The SEC’s 
capacity to oversee firms’ mandatory disclosure filings is a function of both resources 
and workload. To the extent that capacity is a binding constraint on SEC oversight, then 
it should capture the intensity of oversight. If managers make strategic reporting and 
disclosure decisions then, ceteris paribus, the extent of their compliance with reporting 
and disclosure regulations should be increasing with the SEC’s oversight capacity. 
Alternatively, it is possible that oversight capacity is not binding, either because 
regulators could be captured, effort averse, or incompetent. If this were the case, then 
variation in oversight capacity may have little or no influence on managers’ behavior. 
Theory suggests that managers will adjust their reporting and disclosure behavior 
in response to changes in the intensity of SEC oversight if they can either anticipate or 
observe it (Fischer and Verrecchia 2000). Consistent with this, Kedia and Rajgopal 
(2011) find evidence that managers of firms located closer to SEC offices—and thus 
likely to be more informed about the SEC’s oversight activities—are less likely to 
misreport their financial statements. But, their evidence is indirect; because of data 
limitations they are unable to observe the SEC’s oversight activities directly or to infer 
changes in them. While data limitations have prevented researchers from measuring 
changes in the intensity of SEC oversight, firms are likely to be aware of them—at least 
to some extent—because of their use of intermediaries (such as auditors or outside legal 
counsel) that have regular contact with SEC officials. Therefore, it is likely that managers 
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are able to correctly infer the intensity of SEC oversight during any given accounting 
period. 
Nonetheless, prior research has found surprisingly little evidence of a direct effect 
of SEC oversight on managers’ reporting and disclosure behavior. Johnston and Petacchi 
(2013) provide a notable exception; they find evidence that firms improve the quality of 
their reporting and disclosure following resolution of an SEC comment letter. Similarly, 
Robinson et al. (2011) find evidence that firms’ compliance with mandated executive 
compensation disclosures is dependent on the identification of deficiencies by the SEC. A 
common feature of the studies that examine direct effects of SEC oversight, however, is 
that they rely on ex post measures of it and, therefore, they are unable to provide 
evidence regarding managers’ strategic reporting and disclosure behavior. 
Flexibility in accounting standards and variation in regulatory oversight provide 
scope for managers to exercise discretion when preparing mandated reports. The ability 
to exercise discretion allows managers to provide accounting information that more 
accurately reflects the underlying performance of the firm, but also provides them with 
scope to misreport earnings for self-serving purposes (Healy and Wahlen 1999). Theory 
posits that the amount of discretion that managers can exercise is a function of its costs 
and that managerial discretion used to bias information decreases the precision of 
mandated disclosure reports (Fischer and Verrecchia 2000). If increased regulatory 
oversight increases the costs to managers of using reporting discretion to bias financial 
reports then it should function as an ex ante commitment device that limits this behavior, 
resulting in more precise disclosures. To the extent that more precise disclosures 
generally reduce information asymmetry and level the playing field between investors, 
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they should lower adverse selection costs that are manifested in bid-ask spreads 
(Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). I formally state the second hypothesis below (in the null 
form): 
H2: The SEC’s oversight capacity does not affect managers’ financial reporting and 
disclosure behavior. 
There is reason to expect variation in the effects of SEC oversight on managers’ 
reporting and disclosure incentives. Prior research has shown that politically active firms 
are less subject to SEC enforcement actions and less likely to have a restatement initiated 
by an SEC comment letter (Correia 2009). In addition, researchers have found that 
regulators take longer to discover fraud when it is committed by politically active firms 
(Yu and Yu 2011). The theory outlined above suggests that the SEC will devote fewer 
resources to monitoring compliance with disclosure regulations for politically connected 
firms either because the SEC is captured or because it is more costly to pursue 
enforcement actions against them. If firms’ investment in political activity results in the 
capture of SEC regulators, then the reporting and disclosure behavior of these firms’ 
managers should be less responsive to changes in the intensity SEC oversight than the 
behavior of managers of non-politically active firms. Another possibility, however, is that 
firms engaged in the political process are more aware of the SEC’s oversight priorities. If 
this is the case, then managers of firms that are politically active may exhibit reporting 
and disclosure behavior that is more sensitive to changes in the intensity of SEC 
oversight. Finally, a failure to observe either no relationship or an inconsistent 
relationship between the responses to SEC oversight for politically active firms could 
19 
 
result if their engagement in the political activity I measure is not directed toward SEC 
activities. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) introduced the hypothesis that political costs affect 
managers’ reporting and disclosure incentives. They note that crises can heighten 
pressure on politicians and regulators to exact wealth transfers from regulated firms 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1986). The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008 
and subsequent financial crisis was a shock that likely focused political and regulatory 
attention on financial markets. This likely created increased pressure for the SEC to 
ensure that the reporting and disclosures made were especially high quality. Moreover, if 
managers anticipated increased regulatory scrutiny because of the shock to their political 
visibility then the theory outlined above suggests that their reporting and disclosure 
choices would be more responsive to SEC oversight than in prior periods. I formally state 
my third hypothesis (in the null form) below: 
H3: The effect of SEC oversight on managers’ financial reporting and disclosure 
behavior does not vary with firm-specific or economy wide political factors. 
4. Data  
4.1 SEC Disclosure Review Office-Level Budget Allocations 
 I obtain internal SEC data regarding staffing and salary levels in each of the 12 
disclosure review offices of the Division of Corporation Finance and the annual 
budgetary resources for the Division as a whole for fiscal years 2003 to 2012. These data 
are not publically available, but were provided to me by the SEC for research purposes. I 
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use information on employees’ pay grades, SEC pay tables, and the SEC’s congressional 
budget submissions to estimate the salary portion of office-level budgets for each year. I 
then allocate non-salary budgetary resources for the Division of Corporation Finance as a 
whole to each office based on its proportion of the overall number of Division of 
Corporation Finance employees. To ensure consistency across time, I convert my 
estimate of budgetary resources into constant year 2010 dollars (Dollars) using CPI data 
obtained from the Federal Reserve. In fiscal year 2011, the Division split the office 
responsible for reviewing the filings of firms in the financial services industry into two 
offices. Because my analyses rely on lagged industry data, I consolidate the two financial 
services offices into a single entity. Therefore, my office-level sample consists of eleven 
offices over the ten year period, for 110 office-years.  
  I collect data on mandatory disclosure filings subject to Division of Corporation 
Finance Review from EDGAR. The number of firms is the number of unique firms for an 
office that have submitted a mandatory filing in each year. There is likely to be wide 
variation in the complexity of firms’ financial disclosures, which in turn should affect the 
SEC’s ability to review them. Loughran and McDonald (2014) present evidence that the 
size, in megabytes, of a firm’s financial filings on EDGAR is a good measure of their 
complexity. Therefore, I calculate the variable Workload as the aggregate size, in 
megabytes, of all transactional filings deposited on EDGAR that are subject to review by 
a disclosure review office. This measure of workload is designed to capture variation in 
both the volume and complexity of workload conducted by a disclosure review office. 
Finally, I measure Capacity as the amount of dollars (in thousands) per megabyte of 
mandatory filings that each Disclosure Review Office has available to it in a given fiscal 
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year. Descriptive statistics regarding budget, staffing, and workload allocations between 
the eleven offices and across the ten fiscal years are presented in Table 1. 
There is fairly substantial cross-sectional and inter-temporal variance across each 
of the eleven offices and over time. Panel A shows the mean allocations by office. Over 
the sample period, the standard deviation of budgetary resources for each office ranges 
from 9.7% to 22.3% of the mean budget allocation. The largest variation is in Office 7, 
which reviews filings for the financial services industry and experienced a large increase 
in budgetary resources beginning in fiscal year 2010.  Panel B of Table 1 shows the mean 
allocations of budgetary resources and staff for each fiscal year. There is a large increase 
in average budgetary resources from fiscal years 2004 to 2005, as the Division ramped up 
its ability to implement the enhanced disclosure reviews required by the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act, which became effective in 2002. Otherwise, there does not appear to be any inter-
temporal pattern in the annual allocation of budgetary resources. Nonetheless, there is a 
clear upward trend in the volume (in megabytes) of corporate disclosure filings, which 
reflects an increase in mandatory disclosure requirements following Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Dodd-Frank legislation. This trend in filing size has driven a general downward trend in 
oversight capacity. 
 I calculate industry-level variables using all firms in the Compustat/CRSP 
universe. I obtain data on corporate political contributions from the Federal Election 
Commission, on restatement filing dates and beginning periods from Audit Analytics, 
and on IPOs from SDC Platinum. My industry-level measure of political activity, 
IndPolitics, is calculated as the average number of contributions made by firms in an 
industry to the congressional campaigns of candidates with a committee or subcommittee 
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assignment relevant to the SEC in each year. I use two measures to capture the visibility 
of a given industry. The first, PctAAERs, is the percent of firms assigned to a disclosure 
review office in a given year that are subject to an SEC Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release. PctAAERs is an indicator of visible accounting-related problems in 
an industry and SEC activity, which should lead to increased political demand for 
regulatory oversight. The second, Lehman, is an indicator variable for financial services 
firms that is equal to one for fiscal years after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, which is 
a shock that likely increased the political visibility of the financial services industry.  
Next, I calculate controls for industry conditions that affect the workload of the 
disclosure review offices. OfficeIPOs is the natural log of one plus the number of IPOs 
made by firms assigned to the disclosure review office for each year. IPOs are a key 
driver of disclosure review workload, as initial offering materials are subject to a full 
review that takes 4-7 weeks of SEC staff time (GAO 2002). Finally, OfficeCap is the 
natural log of the aggregate market capitalization of all firms covered by a given 
disclosure review office. 
4.2 Firm-Level Data  
 In addition to office- and industry-level data, I construct a firm-level sample using 
firms that filed annual reports on EDGAR between fiscal years 2003 and 2012. I require a 
match between EDGAR and CRSP/Compustat to obtain information firms’ financial 
information and market values. I exclude firms that have both a market capitalization and 
total revenues less than 75 million dollars because they are subject to different disclosure 
requirements than larger firms. My final sample is constructed as the intersection of these 
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three datasets and contains 29,142 firm years (5,159 firms) over the period 2003-2012. In 
addition I obtain—but do not require—restatement data from Audit Analytics, corporate 
political contribution data from the Federal Election Commission, and class action 
litigation data from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. I match each 
firm to the SEC office that reviews its disclosure filings, and measure the intensity of 
SEC oversight based on the federal fiscal year as of the filing date of the firm’s 10-K. 
I examine the relation between SEC oversight and three outcomes of managers’ 
reporting and disclosure choices: the exercise of reporting discretion, misreporting, and 
information asymmetry. The first construct I consider is the amount of discretion that 
managers exercise when making accruals choices. I measure discretion using the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals (Dechow, Ge and Schrand 2010). I calculate my proxy, 
AbsDA_MJ, as the absolute value of the residual obtained from estimating the modified 
Jones model of accruals suggested by Dechow et al. (1995). I use discretionary accruals 
as my measure of discretion for two reasons. First, discretionary accruals are an input in 
the SEC’s accounting quality model, which is used identify firms that may require closer 
regulatory scrutiny (Lewis 2012). If large discretionary accruals are likely to invite more 
intense regulatory oversight then managers may choose to report lower discretionary 
accruals in order to avoid political costs associated with increased regulatory review. 
Because the output from a discretionary accrual model is precisely what managers would 
manipulate to avoid SEC scrutiny, my setting is less contaminated by concerns about 
misspecification of the accruals model and correlated omitted variables than typical 
studies that use discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. In addition, it 
is unlikely that SEC resource allocations are correlated with any omitted variables in the 
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discretionary accruals model. Finally, I do not necessarily want to measure intentional 
misrepresentation of firm performance. Managers may choose to exercise reporting 
discretion either to make earnings more informative for investors or to misreport earnings 
for other, self-serving, purposes (Guay et al. 1996; Healy and Wahlen 1999). Moreover, 
recent evidence suggests that overly optimistic discretion by managers is often the 
catalyst for future intentional misreporting (Schrand and Zechman 2012).  
 I use the incidence of an accounting restatement identified in the AuditAnalytics 
database as my first measure of misreporting. I code the variable Restatement as an 
indicator equal to one for fiscal years in which managers initially provide information 
that is subsequently restated. Prior research suggests that a substantial number of 
restatements are due to unintentional error rather than the result of intentional 
misrepresentation (Hennes, Leone and Miller 2008). Therefore, I only include 
restatements initiated by auditor or regulatory scrutiny. To the extent that the ability of 
the SEC to detect fraud is a function of its resource constraints, limiting the sample to 
these restatements magnifies any selection bias inherent in the restatement sample. 
However, this bias works against my predicted outcome as I predict a negative 
correlation between budgetary resources and restatements. 
 I also use the incidence of class action litigation, identified from the Stanford 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse database, as another proxy for misreporting. The 
litigation data has some important advantages over the restatement data in my setting. 
First, litigation may arise from insufficient or misleading disclosures that are not reflected 
in firms accounting statements. Therefore, this data has potential to capture the broader 
range of disclosures subject to review by the Division of Corporation Finance. Second, 
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private litigation should be less affected by SEC resource constraints than measures that 
rely on SEC actions (Dyck et al. 2013). Some key disadvantages of the litigation data is 
that many lawsuits are frivolous, or not related to deficiencies in disclosure. To mitigate 
these problems, I only include lawsuits arising due to material misrepresentations of firm 
performance or insufficient disclosure. And, I eliminate lawsuits that have been 
dismissed by the courts. 
 Finally, I use two measures of information asymmetry. My first measure is 
Spread, which I calculate as the average effective bid-ask spread scaled by trade price 
using data from CRSP. Theory suggests that information asymmetry is directly manifest 
in bid-ask spreads (Glosten and Milgrom 1985).  And, prior empirical studies frequently 
use bid-ask spreads to proxy for information asymmetry  (Gow, Taylor and Verrecchia 
2012; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). In addition, there is a well-established body of 
theoretical literature that links information asymmetry with liquidity (Vayanos and Wang 
2012). Therefore, consistent with prior empirical studies (e.g. Gow, Taylor and 
Verrecchia 2012; Ng, Verrecchia and Weber 2010), I use the Amihud (2002) measure of 
the illiquidity premium. 
 I use two partitioning variables to measure heterogeneity in the effects of SEC 
oversight. The first partition I consider is firm-level political activity, PolActive, which is 
an indicator variable set to one for firm years where a firm’s political action committee 
has made any donation to a candidate for Congress who is a member of a committee that 
oversees the SEC, or a member of the appropriations subcommittee that provides the SEC 
with its annual budgetary resources. The second partition I consider is an indicator for 
fiscal years following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, which occurred in September 
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2008. In addition, I calculate several control variables that prior literature has shown to be 
associated with each of the three outcomes I test. The details of each of these variables 
are provided in Appendix A. 
5. Results 
5.1 Determinants of SEC Oversight Intensity 
 Table 3 presents the results from estimating the relation between budget 
allocations among disclosure review offices and their hypothesized determinants. I 
estimate a series of regressions using OLS in levels with office and year fixed effects and 
in first-differences with year fixed effects. To mitigate concerns about both cross-
sectional and serial correlation, I calculate bootstrapped standard errors clustered by 
office and year8. Consistent with my prediction, I find a statistically significant negative 
relation between industry-level political activity, IndPolitics and the office-level budget 
allocation. The effects are economically meaningful; a one candidate increase in the 
average number of congressional candidates receiving political contributions per firm in 
an industry is followed by a 56 to 207 thousand dollar decrease in the budget allocated to 
the disclosure review office overseeing it. This represents a 0.6 to 2.2 percent reduction 
in the mean office’s budget allocation. I also find a significant positive relation between 
                                                           
8
 I use bootstrapped standard errors clustered by office and U.S. fiscal year because the variable of interest 
is measured along these dimensions. The small number of groups potentially leads to over-rejection of the 
null hypothesis. Nonetheless, Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2010) show that two-way clustered standard 
errors still outperform alternative procedures to control for cross-sectional and time-series dependence in 
the error terms. Moreover, Cameron et al. (2008) show that calculating clustered standard errors using the 
bootstrap procedure generates rejection rates close to the hypothetical value. 
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visibility resulting from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the budget allocated to 
oversight of the financial services industry.  
In the levels specifications, I find a significant positive relation between the 
percent of firms in an industry subject to an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Release (AAER) in the prior period and the subsequent office-level budget allocation. A 
one percent increase in firms subject to an AAER is followed by a 243 to 420 thousand 
dollar increase in the office’s budget allocation. This suggests that the SEC allocates 
resources in response to publically observable deficiencies in an industry’s accounting 
practices.  I fail to find a significant relation between the budget allocation and two of my 
measures of workload, Workload and OfficeCap.   I document a negative and significant 
relation between resource allocations and the number of IPOs in an industry, which 
suggests that the SEC does a poor job of anticipating workload. When I estimate the 
relation between budget allocations and hypothesized determinants in first differences, I 
fail to find a statistically significant relation for political activity and AAERs, although 
the sign of these effects remains unchanged. One possible explanation for this finding is a 
reduction in the variation of both dependent and independent variables when they are 
differenced.   
 To the extent that I have correctly specified the determinants of SEC oversight 
intensity, my results suggest that SEC oversight is highly responsive to political costs.9 I 
                                                           
9
 A concern about the levels specification is that the SEC uses the prior years’ budget as the basis for 
developing the current years’ budget, which could lead to autocorrelation in the residuals and be an 
important omitted variable. In untabulated robustness tests, I estimate a dynamic model that includes the 
lagged budget using the GMM procedure suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). The results for political 
activity, restatements, and visibility following Lehman remain significant in these tests. However, the 
GMM procedure relies on asymptotic assumptions and may produce inconsistent estimates in small 
samples.  
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am unable, however, to rule out an alternative hypothesis. Namely, it is possible that 
politically active firms are more likely to comply with reporting disclosure regulations 
because of oversight by regulatory institutions other than the SEC. If this is the case, then 
the lower allocation of budgetary resources to offices that review filings in politically 
active industries may be a rational response to lower demand for SEC oversight. 
5.2 SEC Oversight and Reporting Outcomes 
For the analysis of the relationship between SEC oversight and firm-level 
reporting outcomes, I use a measure of abnormal capacity, SEC_Capacity, as my proxy 
for the intensity of SEC oversight. Because I have shown the resource allocation to 
Disclosure Review Offices is affected by aggregate industry-level activity, I calculate 
SEC_Capacity as the residual from the following industry-level regressions: 
,
 =  + ,
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Variation in the intensity of SEC capacity in the proxy I use is the result of changes in 
both office-level budgets and office-level workload from year to year, after controlling 
for common industry factors.  
I then estimate a series of linear models to examine the effects of SEC oversight 
on five measures of reporting outcomes: discretionary accruals, restatements, fraudulent 
disclosures, bid-ask-spreads, and the illiquidity premium. Bertomeu and Magee (2011) 
provide a theoretical justification for an endogenous relation between financial reporting 
quality and regulatory oversight resulting from common macroeconomic shocks. These 
shocks occur at the country-level as they shift the balance of political power between 
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groups favoring greater regulatory oversight and those favoring less. The use of year 
fixed effects mitigates concerns about omitted macroeconomic variables that may be 
correlated with the intensity of SEC oversight and financial reporting outcomes because 
the political environment in my setting is constant across all firms. In addition, year 
effects remove any common time trends. This is an important feature that distinguishes 
my study from studies in an international setting that examine the effects of enforcement 
(Jackson and Roe 2007, Christensen et al. 2011, Christensen et al. 2013), where country-
year level measures of enforcement may be endogenously related to country-year 
macroeconomic shocks. 
I estimate versions of the model using office fixed effects to control for any time 
invariant office characteristics. In addition, I estimate the linear models using firm fixed 
effects to control for time invariant firm characteristics. Assignment to disclosure review 
offices is based on firms’ four digit SIC code, which changes for some firms in my 
sample. Therefore, I also estimate a version of the models containing both firm and office 
fixed effects to capture changes in oversight intensity for these firms 
Estimates from regressions of managers’ financial reporting discretion as a 
function of SEC_Capacity and controls are provided in Table 4. I find evidence of a 
statistically significant and economically meaningful relation between SEC_Capacity and 
the magnitude of discretionary accruals across all specifications that I estimate (t-
statistics between -1.96 and -2.16). The results suggest that a one standard deviation 
increase in SEC_Capacity is associated with a decrease in unsigned discretionary 
accruals equal to 0.9 to 1.7 percent of total assets. This is a considerable effect, 
equivalent to a 4.9 to 9.7 (6.4 to 12.4) percent reduction in the magnitude of the mean 
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(median) firm’s total unsigned discretionary accruals. The evidence is thus consistent 
with managers choosing to exercise less discretion in their financial reporting when the 
intensity of SEC oversight is higher.  
 I present the results from estimating a probit model of the likelihood of an 
accounting restatement as a function of SEC oversight in Panel A of table 5. I use a 
random effects model in columns 3 and 4 to account for unobservable firm-specific 
characteristics.10  Once again, I find a consistently negative relation between 
SEC_Capacity and the likelihood that managers will provide accounting information that 
is eventually restated. The results are statistically significant in three of the four 
specifications. And, the marginal effects are economically meaningful. For the mean 
firm, moving across the interquartile range in SEC_Capacity results in a 0.4 to 0.46 
percent reduction in the probability that a firm’s financial statements will eventually be 
restated. This is especially large when one notes that the unconditional probability of a 
restatement for firms in my sample is only 2.2 percent.   
 Table 5, panel B presents the results of estimating the probit model with litigation 
as the dependent variable. As with the specification with restatements as the dependent 
variable, I find a consistently negative relation between SEC_Capacity and fraud. In this 
case, the relation is significant in all four of the specifications I test. Once again, the 
marginal effects are meaningful; moving across the interquartile range in SEC_Capacity 
results in a 0.37 to 0.44 percent reduction in the probability that a firm will make 
fraudulent disclosures. The economic significance of this effect is even more striking 
                                                           
10
 The use of a large number of fixed effects in non-linear models is both computationally intensive and can 
result in an incidental parameters problem. The use of a random-effects model allows me to control for 
time invariant firm characteristics. 
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when one considers that the unconditional probability of fraud in my sample is only 1.1 
percent. 
 The results from estimating regressions of bid-ask spreads as a function of 
SEC_Capacity are presented in Table 6, panel A. I find a negative relationship between 
spreads and SEC_Capacity in all the models that I estimate. This relationship is 
statistically significant in three of the four specifications I examine. Furthermore, the 
economic magnitude of the relationship is substantial. I document evidence that a one 
standard deviation increase in SEC_Capacity is associated with a 2.5 to 8.8 percent 
reduction in the mean firm’s bid-ask spreads. I also find a negative relationship between 
the illiquidity premium and SEC_Capacity. (results are presented in Table 6, panel B). As 
with bid-ask spreads, the findings are statistically significant in three of the four 
specifications I test, and large in economic impact; a one standard deviation increase in 
SEC_Capacity is associated with a 14.2 to 25.6 percent reduction in the mean firm’s 
illiquidity premium. 
 In the aggregate, the results from my estimates of the main effects of 
SEC_Capacity on managers’ reporting outcomes suggest that SEC oversight has a 
substantial effect on managers reporting decisions. 
5.3 Heterogeneity in the Effects of SEC Oversight 
 I conduct partitioned tests using of two sources of potential heterogeneity in the 
effects of SEC oversight on managers’ reporting and disclosure choices. In the first set of 
tests, I partition the sample into politically active versus non-politically active firms. The 
results are presented in Panel A of Table 7. I fail to find a consistent relation for the 
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coefficient on the interaction between SEC oversight and the partitioning variable for 
political activity accruals and bid-ask spreads and the outcomes I measure. One potential 
explanation for the mixed evidence is that firms engage in the political activity I measure 
to influence regulators other than the SEC. If this is the case, then the relationship I 
document between political activity and the SEC’s internal budget allocations in Table 3 
likely arise due to the Gordon and Hafer (2005) signaling hypothesis rather than because 
of regulatory capture. 
  I next use the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as an unexpected shock to political 
visibility. I interact an indicator variable for periods following the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy with firms whose disclosures are reviewed by the disclosure review office 
with responsibility for the financial services sector and SEC_Capacity. Panel B of Table 
7 presents the results of my analysis. I find that following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers the intensity of SEC oversight has a stronger effect on all of the outcomes I 
measure except for bid-ask spreads, although the relationship is only significant for the 
illiquidity premium. While the evidence is weak, my findings generally suggest that a 
shift in political power from firms to investors is followed by increased responsiveness of 
managers’ reporting and disclosure incentives to changes in SEC oversight. One possible 
explanation for the lack of statistically significant findings could be that SEC_Capacity is 
generally a binding constraint on the overall intensity of SEC oversight. Therefore, the 
overall effect of the Lehman crisis on oversight may have been subsumed by the 
corresponding increase in SEC_Capacity.  
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5.4 Robustness Tests 
5.4.1  Determinants of SEC Resource Allocations 
A concern regarding my estimates of the relationship between industry-level 
political activity and the SEC’s allocation of resources to its disclosure review offices is 
the possibility that they may be jointly determined. I conduct two separate analyses to 
mitigate this concern. The first is a simultaneous equations model that assumes an 
endogenous relation between SEC resource allocations and industry-level political 
activity. The identification of the simultaneous equation model requires an instrument for 
each endogenous variable in the system of equations. 
I use an indicator variable coded as one following a change in assistant director 
overseeing a disclosure review office to instrument for the Dollars allocated to a given 
disclosure review office.  A change in assistant director is likely to be negatively 
correlated with resource allocations, as newer directors have less ability to negotiate for 
additional resources in internal budget negotiations. In addition, SEC assistant director 
turnover is a strong candidate as an instruments for the resource allocation because it is 
likely to be idiosyncratic and thus uncorrelated with firms’ incentives to engage in 
political activity beyond its effect on SEC resource allocations. I am unable to directly 
infer why assistant directors leave the SEC. However, for a substantial portion of my 
sample period—between fiscal years 2008 and 2012—the primary reason for supervisor 
turnover at the SEC was due to retirements (GAO 2013b).   
 I following prior literature (Grier et al. 1996; Hill et al. 2013) and use industry 
concentration, which I measure as the average Herfindahl Index calculated by 4-digit SIC 
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code, as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in industry-level incentives to engage 
in the political process. More concentrated industries are less likely to suffer from free-
rider problems and thus be able to reap greater gains from political activity. And, industry 
concentration is unlikely to be correlated with SEC resource allocations, other than via its 
effect on industry-level political activity.   
 The results from estimating the simultaneous equations model are presented in 
Table 8, panel A. I find evidence that industry-level political activity has a substantial 
negative effect on the allocation of resources to an SEC disclosure review office as seen 
in the first column. Consistent with the notion that this effect is an unintended 
consequence of firms’ political activity, I fail to find evidence that SEC oversight affects 
industry-level political behavior. The partial F-statistic for AvgHerf is 11.55, which 
suggests that it is a strong instrument for IndPolitics. However, the partial F-statistic for 
∆Supervisor is only 2.94, which suggests that it is a weak instrument for Dollars. The 
weakness of this instrument could result in biased coefficients. Therefore, I conduct a 
second analysis that relies solely on variation in AvgHerf to identify the effect of 
IndPolitics on Dollars. 
 The result of the instrumental variables analysis is presented in Table 8, panel B. 
As in the prior analyses, I document a large negative effect of IndPolitics on the 
resources allocated to an SEC Disclosure Review Office. The partial F-statistic for 
AvgHerf is 11.15, which suggests that the instrument is strong. Overall, the results in 
Table 8 suggest that the SEC devotes fewer resources to review mandatory disclosure 
filings when industries are more politically active. 
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5.4.2 SEC Oversight Capacity and Reporting Outcomes 
5.4.2.1 Office-Level Analysis 
 Because the treatment of interest, SEC_Capacity, is an office-level variable, I 
conduct a separate analysis of the outcomes calculated at the office-level. I follow the 
procedure in Hail and Leuz (2006) to calculate office-level outcome variables. To 
account for heterogeneity within disclosure review offices, I first calculate yearly 
regressions for each outcome with firm-level controls and SEC office fixed effects. I then 
use the office fixed effect as an office-level measure of the outcome. The results of this 
analysis are presented in Table 9. As with the firm-level analyses, I document a 
consistent negative relation between SEC oversight capacity and office-level measures of 
reporting and disclosure quality. In the office-level analysis, however, the capital market 
benefits of SEC oversight are not statistically significant. 
5.4.2.2 Falsification Tests 
 I conduct two falsification tests as robustness checks to further validate my 
empirical findings. First, I conduct my main tests using the prior years’ proxy for the 
intensity of SEC oversight as a falsification test to mitigate concerns that my findings 
may be driven by industry-level trends. Panel A of Table 10 presents the results when 
lagged SEC_Oversight is used at the treatment variable. I fail to find evidence of a 
significant relation between SEC oversight and my measures of reporting and disclosure 
outcomes. This suggests that the results I find are not driven by office-level trends.  
Second, I conduct a placebo test by randomly assigning firms to a disclosure review 
office and substituting the randomly assigned level of SEC_Oversight for the actual level.  
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The results of the placebo test are presented in Panel B of Table 8. I fail to find any 
significant relation between the placebo and firms’ reporting outcomes. These tests 
further validate my findings that variation in the intensity of oversight at the SEC-office 
level affects managers’ reporting incentives.   
5.4.2.3 Exclusion of Financial Services 
 Following the financial crisis, in fiscal year 2011, the Division split the office 
responsible for reviewing the filings of firms in the financial services industry into two 
offices. A concern is that the large increase in resources allocated to the financial services 
industry as a result of the crisis could be driving my results. Therefore, my final set of 
robustness tests excludes firms in the financial services industry from my firm-level 
analyses. The results of this analysis are provided in Table 10, panel C. As can be seen, 
excluding financial services firms generally increases the magnitude and significance of 
my findings. Therefore, it is unlikely that my findings are driven by the increase in 
oversight of these firms. 
6. Conclusion 
 This study provides insights into forces that shape the SEC’s oversight of 
corporate disclosures and provides plausibly causal evidence that SEC oversight affects 
managers’ reporting and disclosure incentives. Consistent with extant theories of 
regulatory behavior, I find evidence that the intensity of SEC oversight is associated with 
industry-level political activity and visibility. However, I find mixed results when I test 
whether political activity at the firm level reduces the effect of SEC oversight on 
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managers’ behavior. My findings suggest that previously documented results regarding 
the relationship between firms’ political activity and misreporting may result because the 
SEC devotes fewer resources to monitoring these firms’ disclosure filings, and not 
because the SEC is captured. Overall, the results suggest that managers exercise less 
financial reporting discretion and are less likely to misreport financial information when 
the SEC has a greater capacity to review their mandatory disclosure filings. SEC 
oversight also has some beneficial capital market consequences, as bid-ask spreads and 
the illiquidity premium are lower when oversight is more intense. 
 The variation in the SEC’s oversight capacity in my sample is limited. Yet, even 
after controlling for inter-temporal and industry-level variation in oversight capacity I 
find evidence that oversight affects managers’ behavior. This suggests that SEC oversight 
has a first order effect on managers’ reporting and disclosure incentives. Nonetheless, 
policy makers should exercise caution before drawing any conclusions from my results. 
Prior research suggests that private monitoring activities may be more efficient than SEC 
enforcement (Dyck et al 2010). In addition, I only examine potential benefits of SEC 
oversight. It is not clear whether the observed benefits of greater SEC oversight capacity 
outweigh their costs. Regardless of the desirability of SEC oversight, my results suggest 
that the SEC does play an important role in shaping managers’ incentives to provide 
information to capital markets. 
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APPENDIX 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Disclosure Review Office- and Industry-Level Variables 
Dollars The estimated budget allocation in thousands of constant 2010 year 
dollars for the Division of Corporation Finance disclosure review 
office for the fiscal year. 
Workload The size, in megabytes, of mandatory filings on EDGAR subject to 
potential review by the Division of Corporation Finance disclosure 
review office for the fiscal year. 
Capacity Dollars/Workload. 
SEC_Capacity The residual from the following office-level regression:  
,

=  + ,
 + ,

+ ,
 + ,
 +  ,
 
Positions The number of staff in the Division of Corporation Finance 
disclosure review office during fiscal year. 
IndPolitics The average number of contributions made by firms in an industry 
to the congressional campaigns of candidates with a committee or 
subcommittee assignment relevant to the SEC in each year.  
Lehman An indicator variable equal to one for the financial services 
industry in years following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. 
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PctAAERs The percent of firms assigned to a Disclosure Review Office 
subject to an AAER in the prior year. 
OfficeCap The natural log of the aggregate market capitalization of all firms 
in a given disclosure review office during the year. 
∆Supervisor An indicator variable equal to one following a change in Assistant 
Director for a given Disclosure Review Office. 
AvgHerf The average Herfindahl Index for firms subject to review by a 
Disclosure Review Office, calculated at the four digit SIC level. 
 
Measures of Reporting and Disclosure Outcomes 
AbsDA_MJt The absolute value of discretionary accruals scaled by total assets, 
calculated as residuals from an estimate of the modified Jones 
(1991) model of accruals calculated for each two digit SIC code 
and fiscal year. 
Restatementt An indicator variable equal to one for years when the firm reports 
accounting information that is later restated. 
Fraud An indicator variable equal to one for years when a firm initially 
fails to disclose material information or makes a material 
misrepresentation of information that later results in class-action 
litigation 
Spreadst The natural log of the bid-ask spread scaled by price. 
Illiquidity The Amihud (2002) measure of the illiquidity premium 
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Firm Controls 
Sizet The natural log of the firm’s market value of equity at the end of 
the fiscal year. 
BMt The book value of equity scaled by market value of equity at the 
end of fiscal year. 
Leveraget Total liabilities divided by total assets. 
FirmAget The number of years that the firm appears on Compustat. 
ROAt Net income scaled by total assets. 
Rett Buy-and-hold returns over the fiscal year. 
 
Financing An indicator equal to one if a firm issues debt or equity greater 
than twenty percent of its book assets. 
Acquisition An indicator equal to one if a firm makes an acquisition that 
contributes to its sales. 
 
1/Pricet The inverse of the firm’s stock price at the end of fiscal year. 
Turnovert  The average monthly share volume scaled by shares outstanding 
   over the fiscal year. 
Betat  The slope coefficient estimated from a market model of monthly
 security returns over the fiscal year. 
Volatilityt The standard deviation of monthly returns over the fiscal year. 
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PolActivet An indicator variable equal to one for firm years in which a firm’s 
political action committee makes a contribution to a congressional 
campaign. 
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Figure 1 
Timeline of the Budget Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August/September 2003 
SEC submits its budget 
request to the Office of 
Management and Budget 
(OMB) for fiscal year 
2005. 
 
December 2003 
OMB approves SEC 
budget request. 
 
February 2004 
SEC budget request is 
transmitted to 
Congress. 
 
October 2004 
Congress provides 
SEC Appropriations 
for fiscal year 2005 
 
September 2005 
Fiscal year 2005 
ends 
 
Fiscal Year 2005 Budget implemented 
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Table 1: Office-Level Resource Allocations 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the disclosure review offices in the SEC’s Division of 
Corporation Finance from fiscal years 2003-2012. Panel A reports resource and workload allocations for 
each of the 11 disclosure review offices across the entire sample period. Panel B reports the resource and 
workload allocations across all offices for each fiscal year. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 1 (Cont’d): Office-Level Resource Allocations 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics by Office 
 
Office Primary Industry Statistic Dollars Positions #Firms Workload Capacity 
1 Healthcare and Insurance Mean 8964.77 32.0 824.0 13416.5 0.837 
Std 1219.01 3.8 114.7 7833.9 0.349 
2 Consumer Products Mean 9383.56 33.8 641.8 14292.3 0.924 
Std 1300.04 4.5 55.3 10218.6 0.472 
3 Information Technologies & Services Mean 9322.92 33.2 1067.4 11713.3 0.891 
Std 1370.64 3.7 215.3 5178.3 0.258 
4 Natural Resources Mean 10283.58 36.5 599.7 10013.1 1.402 
Std 1802.64 4.1 31.1 6026.6 0.822 
5 Transportation and Leisure Mean 9832.01 35.1 835.4 11897.6 0.978 
Std 1746.69 5.0 100.4 6138.2 0.357 
6 Manufacturing and Construction Mean 9831.93 35.1 842.2 11606.0 1.042 
Std 1470.11 4.3 67.1 6469.0 0.423 
7 Financial Services Mean 10177.35 35.5 1082.0 28003.0 0.598 
Std 2268.01 5.6 172.1 30430.9 0.293 
8 Real Estate and Commodities Mean 8801.29 31.7 833.0 12621.4 0.905 
Std 1185.09 4.2 68.6 8535.0 0.383 
9 Beverages, Apparel, and Mining Mean 7936.51 28.4 624.0 11372.7 0.993 
Std 767.80 2.4 75.1 5641.2 0.775 
10 Electronics and Machinery Mean 9279.18 32.9 836.0 10901.3 1.052 
Std 1574.55 4.3 53.3 6176.7 0.427 
11 Telecommunications Mean 9545.72 34.0 720.9 10983.5 0.972 
  
  Std 1502.67 4.9 73.1 4403.2 0.303 
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Table 1 (Cont’d): Office-Level Resource Allocations 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics by Fiscal Year 
Fiscal Year Statistic Dollars Positions #Firms Workload Capacity 
2003 Mean 6605.35 25.72 910.4 4199.2 1.74 
Std 488.57 1.95 280.2 1190.2 0.71 
2004 Mean 7913.13 36.27 871.5 5992.4 1.38 
Std 537.02 2.49 251.6 1359.8 0.32 
2005 Mean 10905.17 38.27 859.9 8336.5 1.34 
Std 862.43 3.00 227.9 1526.4 0.24 
2006 Mean 10008.35 34.72 832.1 9844.5 1.04 
Std 1094.60 3.93 192.1 1480.1 0.21 
2007 Mean 9383.01 33.55 834.6 11447.4 0.84 
Std 899.73 3.36 165.6 2105.8 0.17 
2008 Mean 9445.38 34.72 835.9 11498.6 0.84 
Std 606.45 2.15 149.7 2176.5 0.13 
2009 Mean 9140.66 32.72 797.5 11475.2 0.82 
Std 928.05 3.26 120.8 2777.6 0.16 
2010 Mean 10705.56 34.45 745.9 14874.2 0.76 
Std 1086.88 3.72 99.8 4507.2 0.18 
2011 Mean 10372.11 33.09 721.3 22170.5 0.52 
Std 1491.76 4.76 95.6 10709.2 0.16 
2012 Mean 9483.85 31.18 691.9 33635 0.33 
  
Std 1583.40 5.10 96.9 24550.9 0.10 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics  
 
This table presents summary statistics for the data used to analyze the determinants of SEC monitoring 
intensity. Panel A contains aggregate industry-level statistics for the firms reviewed by the 11 SEC 
disclosure review offices between fiscal years 2003 and 2012 for a total of 110 office-years. The remaining 
panels contains summary statistics at the firm-level for the time period between fiscal years 2003 and 2012, 
and cover a total of 29,142 firm years. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the measures of information 
quality. Panel C reports summary statistics for selected firm characteristics. All variables are defined as in 
Appendix A. 
Panel A: Office-Level Measures 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th  Median 75th  
Dollars 110 9396.26 1583.81 8437.86 9466.11 10300.67 
Positions 110 33.47 4.64 31.00 34.00 36.00 
#Firms 110 897.63 429.17 666.00 803.50 941.00 
Workload 110 13347.33 11760.73 8265.35 10578.31 14894.61 
Capacity 110 0.96 0.49 0.65 0.90 1.23 
IndPolitics 110 4.12 1.90 2.49 4.05 5.27 
PctAAER 110 0.84 0.54 0.39 0.73 1.15 
OfficeCap 110 13.97 0.51 13.71 14.03 14.32 
OfficeIPOs 110 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Panel B: Measures of Information Quality 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th  Median 75th  
AbsDA_MJ 29,142 17.181 15.938 5.144 13.349 24.326 
Restatement 29,142 0.022 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fraud 29,142 0.011 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Spreads 29,142 0.555 1.209 0.092 0.177 0.454 
Illiquidity 29,142 1.538 28.219 0.001 0.004 0.039 
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Table 2 (Cont’d): Summary Statistics  
 
Panel C: Firm Characteristics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th  Median 75th  
Size 29,142 6.520 1.709 5.279 6.377 7.611 
BM 29,142 0.590 0.480 0.279 0.472 0.741 
Leverage 29,142 0.481 0.226 0.300 0.487 0.651 
FirmAge 29,142 21.812 15.211 10.000 16.000 30.000 
ROA 29,142 -0.001 0.168 -0.010 0.035 0.075 
Ret 29,142 0.178 0.622 -0.181 0.084 0.383 
Financing 29,142 0.224 0.417 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Acquisition 29,142 0.116 0.320 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1/Price 29,142 0.111 0.154 0.031 0.056 0.120 
Turnover 29,142 9.482 8.130 3.959 7.302 12.262 
Volatility 29,142 0.031 0.018 0.019 0.027 0.037 
Beta 29,142 1.085 0.550 0.705 1.067 1.428 
PolActive 29,142 0.163 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lehman 29,142 0.006 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 3: Determinants of SEC Oversight Intensity 
 
This table presents the results from an OLS regression of SEC Disclosure Review Office budget allocations 
as a function of hypothesized determinants of SEC oversight intensity. Columns (1) - (3) present the results 
using a levels specification, while columns (4) - (6) present the results from estimating the regression in 
first-differences. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. t-statistics appear in parentheses and are 
calculated using bootstrapped standard errors clustered by office and fiscal year. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
Table 3 (Cont’d): Determinants of SEC Oversight Intensity 
 
 
  Dollars ∆Dollars 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
IndPolitics -207.613*** -110.668* -162.311*** -115.472 -55.815 -92.967 
(-3.67) (-1.67) (-2.90) (-0.89) (-0.37) (-0.78) 
PctAAER 419.820** 344.071** 256.789 242.738 
(2.18) (2.26) (1.13) (1.09) 
Lehman 1,986.334** 1,900.489** 851.618*** 789.610*** 
(2.34) (2.22) (3.22) (3.04) 
OfficeCap -91.295 357.902 377.979 -251.076 -161.581 -154.143 
(-0.37) (0.84) (1.00) (-0.42) (-0.23) (-0.22) 
OfficeIPOs -551.567 -927.614*** -833.495*** -1,106.529*** -1,166.010*** -1,142.472*** 
(-1.27) (-2.88) (-2.62) (-3.29) (-3.39) (-3.48) 
Workload 1,393.964 629.077 636.638 352.634 91.656 265.197 
(1.06) (0.45) (0.49) (0.20) (0.05) (0.15) 
Office Effects Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 110 110 110 99 99 99 
R2 0.820 0.835 0.839 0.738 0.737 0.740 
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Table 4: SEC Oversight and Financial Reporting Discretion 
 
This table presents the results from an OLS regression of discretionary accruals as a function of SEC 
oversight capacity and control variables. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. t-statistics appear in 
parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by office and year. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
  AbsDA_MJ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
SEC_Capacity -3.790** -2.073** -2.125** -1.944** 
(-2.10) (-2.00) (-2.16) (-1.96) 
Size -0.809*** -0.790*** -0.328 -0.300 
(-3.78) (-3.34) (-0.62) (-0.58) 
BM -3.361*** -2.693** -0.494 -0.444 
(-2.76) (-2.01) (-0.70) (-0.64) 
Leverage -4.687* -2.798 4.447*** 4.633*** 
(-1.96) (-0.99) (3.72) (3.84) 
Firm_Age -0.006 0.015 0.688 0.729 
(-0.21) (0.57) (1.14) (1.15) 
ROA -4.845** -3.313 0.223** 2.313 
(-2.09) (-1.57) (2.11) (1.16) 
Ret 0.135 0.266 2.249 0.217** 
(0.73) (1.46) (1.14) (2.03) 
Financing 0.649 0.880 -0.278 -0.248 
(1.14) (1.53) (-0.70) (-0.65) 
Acquisition -0.102 -0.783* -0.420** -0.415** 
(-0.21) (-1.71) (-2.55) (-2.37) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Office Effects No Yes No Yes 
Firm Effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 29,142 29,142 29,142 29,142 
R2 0.055 0.084 0.479 0.480 
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 Table 5: SEC Oversight and Misreporting 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the likelihood of misreporting as a function of SEC oversight 
capacity. The dependent variable for panel A is the incidence of financial reporting that is subsequently 
restated. The dependent variable for panel B is the incidence of fraudulent disclosure that is subsequently 
subject to class-action litigation. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. For both panels, columns (1) 
and (2) are estimated using a probit model, t-statistics appear in parentheses and are calculated using 
standard errors clustered by SEC disclosure review office and year. And, columns (3) and (4) are estimated 
using a random effects probit model with standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Restatements 
 
  Restatement 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
SEC_Capacity -0.155** -0.193 -0.318* -0.337* 
(-1.98) (-1.46) (-1.89) (-1.68) 
Size 0.057* 0.059* 0.167*** 0.162*** 
(1.72) (1.73) (2.80) (2.75) 
BM 0.098** 0.098** 0.210* 0.197 
(2.20) (2.25) (1.74) (1.63) 
Leverage 0.255*** 0.252*** 0.352 0.262 
(2.67) (2.65) (1.18) (0.85) 
Firm_Age -0.005** -0.006** -0.011* -0.013* 
(-2.37) (-2.56) (-1.68) (-1.85) 
ROA -0.223 -0.246 -0.271 -0.318 
(-1.17) (-1.16) (-0.85) (-1.02) 
Ret 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
(0.07) (0.04) (-0.03) (-0.05) 
Financing 0.006 0.004 0.044 0.044 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.47) (0.48) 
Acquisition 0.083*** 0.080*** 0.107 0.110 
(2.72) (2.83) (1.16) (1.20) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Office Effects No Yes No Yes 
Firm Effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 29,142 29,142 29,142 29,142 
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Table 5 (Cont’d): SEC Oversight and Misreporting 
 
Panel B: Fraud 
 
  Fraud 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
SEC_Capacity -0.321*** -0.296** -0.327*** -0.299*** 
(-2.65) (-2.02) (-4.03) (-2.68) 
Size 0.081*** 0.074*** 0.083*** 0.075*** 
(4.11) (3.84) (4.99) (4.62) 
BM -0.161*** -0.138*** -0.166** -0.140** 
(-6.88) (-5.70) (-2.34) (-2.03) 
Leverage 0.004 0.070 0.004 0.070 
(0.02) (0.44) (0.03) (0.69) 
Firm_Age -0.005 -0.004 -0.005*** -0.004** 
(-1.57) (-1.31) (-2.86) (-2.07) 
ROA -0.247** -0.092 -0.245* -0.090 
(-2.39) (-0.79) (-1.95) (-0.69) 
Ret 0.063** 0.067** 0.062 0.067* 
(2.04) (2.01) (1.62) (1.78) 
Financing 0.128*** 0.147*** 0.130** 0.148*** 
(2.59) (2.74) (2.44) (2.80) 
Acquisition -0.010 -0.008 -0.011 -0.008 
(-0.20) (-0.14) (-0.15) (-0.12) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Office Effects No Yes No Yes 
Firm Effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 29,142 29,142 29,142 29,142 
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Table 6: SEC Oversight and Information Asymmetry 
 
This table presents the results from an OLS regression of proxies for information asymmetry as a function 
of SEC oversight intensity and control variables. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. t-statistics 
appear in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by office and year. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Bid-Ask Spreads 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
SEC_Capacity -0.037 -0.112*** -0.033*** -0.034*** 
(-0.67) (-3.13) (-3.83) (-3.61) 
Size -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.145*** -0.145*** 
(-5.40) (-5.40) (-2.94) (-2.96) 
BM 0.120* 0.101 -0.018 -0.019 
(1.79) (1.61) (-0.27) (-0.27) 
1/Price 1.319*** 1.363*** 0.262 0.265 
(5.36) (5.32) (1.15) (1.16) 
Turnover -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.021*** 
(-6.06) (-5.92) (-4.19) (-4.20) 
Volatility 3.189*** 3.197*** 2.193*** 2.193*** 
(8.95) (9.18) (6.80) (6.80) 
Beta -0.485*** -0.498*** -0.169*** -0.169*** 
(-6.51) (-6.46) (-5.58) (-5.52) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Office Effects No Yes No Yes 
Firm Effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 29,142 29,142 29,142 29,142 
R2 0.395 0.397 0.767 0.768 
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Table 6 (Cont’d): SEC Oversight and Information Asymmetry 
 
Panel B: Illiquidity 
 
  Illiquidity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
SEC_Capacity -0.009*** -0.005 -0.005*** -0.005*** 
(-4.97) (-1.23) (-4.36) (-4.35) 
Size -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 
(-1.60) (-1.59) (-1.57) (-1.57) 
BM 0.014* 0.013* -0.004 -0.004 
(1.73) (1.71) (-0.51) (-0.51) 
1/Price 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.038 0.039 
(3.33) (3.37) (1.36) (1.41) 
Turnover -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** 
(-2.60) (-2.66) (-2.29) (-2.30) 
Volatility 0.099 0.100 0.059 0.059 
(1.42) (1.42) (1.32) (1.33) 
Beta -0.025*** -0.027** -0.008 -0.008 
(-2.73) (-2.55) (-1.26) (-1.24) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Office Effects No Yes No Yes 
Firm Effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 29,142 29,142 29,142 29,142 
R-squared 0.018 0.019 0.536 0.536 
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Table 7: Heterogeneity in the Effect of SEC Oversight 
 
This table presents evidence on cross-sectional variation in the relationship between SEC oversight and 
managers’ financial reporting and disclosure behavior. Panel A presents evidence of variation in the effect 
for politically active firms. Panel B presents evidence of variation in the effect before and after the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008. In each panel, columns (1), (4), and (5) are estimated using OLS 
and standard errors are clustered by office and year. Columns (2) and (3) are estimated using a random 
effects probit model with standard errors clustered by firm. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. t-
statistics appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 (Cont’d): Heterogeneity in the Effect of SEC Oversight 
 
Panel A: Politically Active Firms 
 
  AbsDA_MJ Restatement Fraud Spread Illiquidity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
SEC_Capacity -1.807* -0.436** -0.268** -0.037*** -0.008*** 
(-1.81) (-2.08) (-2.41) (-5.31) (-3.72) 
SEC_Capacity*PolActive -0.794*** 0.616** -0.234* 0.018 0.013*** 
(-3.66) (2.15) (-1.81) (0.40) (2.93) 
PolActive 0.009 -0.326 -0.002 0.018 -0.004* 
(0.01) (-1.46) (-0.03) (0.91) (-1.82) 
Size -0.298 0.184*** 0.073*** -0.145** -0.008 
(-0.57) (2.93) (4.40) (-2.53) (-1.54) 
BM -0.436 0.219* -0.143** -0.019 -0.004 
(-0.63) (1.78) (-2.07) (-0.24) (-0.51) 
Leverage 4.689*** 0.292 0.070 
(3.98) (0.93) (0.69) 
Firm_Age 0.728 -0.013* -0.004** 
(1.15) (-1.87) (-2.00) 
ROA 2.319 -0.323 -0.087 
(1.16) (-1.01) (-0.66) 
Ret 0.215** -0.003 0.067* 
(2.06) (-0.05) (1.78) 
Financing -0.247 0.042 0.149*** 
(-0.64) (0.45) (2.82) 
Acquisition -0.411** 0.104 -0.008 
(-2.30) (1.11) (-0.11) 
1/Price 0.264 0.039 
(0.98) (1.39) 
Turnover -0.021*** -0.001** 
(-3.60) (-2.28) 
Volatility 2.192*** 0.059 
(5.67) (1.32) 
Beta -0.169*** -0.008 
(-4.70) (-1.25) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Office Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 29,142 29,142 29,142 29,142 29,142 
R2 0.481 0.385 0.049 0.768 0.536 
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Table 7 (Cont’d): Heterogeneity in the Effect of SEC Oversight 
 
Panel B: Post Lehman Brothers Crisis 
 
  AbsDA_MJ Restatement Fraud Spread Illiquidity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
SEC_Capacity -1.873* -0.337* -0.299*** -0.035*** -0.005*** 
(-1.95) (-1.68) (-2.69) (-4.24) (-3.80) 
SEC_Capacity*Lehman -2.322 -0.211 -0.492 0.327 -0.138*** 
(-0.35) (-0.49) (-0.24) (0.98) (-7.94) 
Lehman 7.531*** 0.120 -0.311 0.025 -0.049*** 
(7.39) (0.15) (-0.39) (0.19) (-3.95) 
Size -0.292 0.162*** 0.074*** -0.145*** -0.008 
(-0.56) (2.75) (4.63) (-2.96) (-1.57) 
BM -0.488 0.197 -0.140** -0.018 -0.004 
(-0.71) (1.64) (-2.02) (-0.26) (-0.52) 
Leverage 4.644*** 0.264 0.069 
(3.82) (0.86) (0.68) 
Firm_Age 0.726 -0.013* -0.004** 
(1.15) (-1.86) (-2.07) 
ROA 2.281 -0.318 -0.089 
(1.14) (-1.01) (-0.68) 
Ret 0.218** -0.003 0.066* 
(2.12) (-0.05) (1.78) 
Financing -0.282 0.043 0.148*** 
(-0.73) (0.47) (2.80) 
Acquisition -0.408** 0.111 -0.009 
(-2.30) (1.21) (-0.13) 
1/Price 0.263 0.039 
(1.15) (1.41) 
Turnover -0.021*** -0.001** 
(-4.20) (-2.29) 
Volatility 2.194*** 0.060 
(6.80) (1.33) 
Beta -0.169*** -0.007 
(-5.52) (-1.24) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Office Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 29,142 29,142 29,142 29,142 29,142 
R2 0.482 0.374 0.048 0.768 0.536 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
Table 8: Instrumental Variable Analysis 
 
This table presents the results from tests using instrumental variables. All variables are as defined in 
Appendix A. Panel A presents the results from estimating the following simultaneous equations model: 
"#,
 = ,
 + $%,
 + &∆()#*#,
 +  ,
 
,
 = "#,
 + $%,
 + &*+,#,
 + -,
 
Standard errors are calculated using the generalized method of moments. Panel B presents the results from 
estimating the effect of IndPolitics on Dollars using 2SLS. Column (1) presents the first stage output and 
column (2) presents the second-stage estimates. Standard errors clustered by office and year. 
 t-statistics appear in parentheses and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Simultaneous estimation of SEC Oversight and Industry Political Activity 
 
  Dollars IndPolitics 
(1) (2) 
      
IndPolitics -558.986* 
(-1.85) 
Dollars 0.001 
(0.74) 
PctAAER 656.189** 0.780*** 
(2.17) (2.76) 
OfficeIPOs -393.286 1.016 
(-0.62) (1.18) 
OfficeCap -184.960 -0.023 
(-0.43) (-0.05) 
Workload 991.209* -1.008 
(1.73) (-0.92) 
∆Supervisor -577.240* 
(-1.78) 
AvgHerf 28.852** 
(2.25) 
Office Effects Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Partial F-Statistic for ∆Supervisor 2.94 
Partial F-Statistic for AvgHerf 11.55 
Observations 110 110 
R2 0.806 0.835 
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Table 8 (Cont’d): Instrumental Variable Analysis 
 
Panel B: Instrumental Variables Estimation 
 
  IndPolitics Dollars 
  (1) (2) 
  
AvgHerf 20.980** 
(2.28) 
IndPolitics -612.502** 
(-2.01) 
PctAAER 0.880** 701.941* 
(2.51) (1.83) 
OfficeIPOS -0.075 -130.014 
(-0.14) (-0.36) 
OfficeCap 0.609 -290.897 
(1.29) (-0.54) 
Workload -0.323 920.600 
(-1.06) (0.70) 
Office Effects Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Partial F-Statistic for AvgHerf 11.15 
Observations 110 110 
R2 0.901 0.794 
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Table 9: Industry-Level Outcomes 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the relationship between SEC oversight capacity and 
industry-level outcomes. The dependent variables are calculated by first estimating firm-level regressions 
on the full set of firm-specific controls plus officefixed effects. I subsequently regress these office fixed 
effects on the office-level variables. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. t-statistics appear in 
parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered by office and year. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
  AbsDA_MJ Restatement Fraud Spread Illiquidity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Capacity -2.174*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.031 -0.009 
(-2.90) (-3.49) (-3.46) (-0.81) (-0.93) 
IndPolitics -0.712* -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 -0.003** 
(-1.76) (-0.62) (-0.25) (-0.27) (-2.28) 
PctAAER 3.323*** 0.004*** -0.003 0.010 -0.016 
(6.13) (4.18) (-0.88) (0.29) (-1.26) 
OfficeCap 2.620*** -0.011* -0.004* 0.085 -0.029 
(7.20) (-1.83) (-1.67) (1.63) (-1.40) 
OfficeIPOs 1.857* -0.000 0.005** 0.170 0.015 
(1.77) (-0.44) (2.17) (1.26) (1.61) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 110 110 110 110 110 
R2 0.652 0.899 0.655 0.970 0.811 
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Table 10: Robustness Tests 
 
This table presents the results from three robustness tests. Panel A presents the results when the lagged 
value of SEC_Oversight is used in place of the current period. Panel B presents results from randomly 
assigning firms to an SEC disclosure review office. And, Panel C presents the results when financial 
services firms are excluded from the sample. In each panel, columns (1), (4), and (5) are estimated using 
OLS with standard errors clustered by office and year. Columns (2) and (3) are estimated using a random 
effects probit model with standard errors clustered by firm. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. t-
statistics appear in parentheses and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Lagged Oversight 
 
  AbsDA_MJ Restatement Fraud Spread Illiquidity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
SEC_Capacity -1.036 -0.317 0.022 0.005 -0.005 
(-0.79) (-1.48) (0.18) (0.16) (-1.08) 
Size -0.130 0.110* 0.074*** -0.164*** -0.009 
(-0.18) (1.76) (4.39) (-2.92) (-1.33) 
BM -0.229 0.227* -0.142* -0.062 -0.004 
(-0.25) (1.76) (-1.89) (-0.84) (-0.30) 
Leverage 4.371*** 0.203 0.117 
(3.21) (0.63) (1.06) 
Firm_Age 1.519*** -0.012* -0.003 
(3.13) (-1.69) (-1.61) 
ROA 1.497 -0.348 0.006 
(0.57) (-1.12) (0.04) 
Ret 0.066 -0.034 0.061 
(0.32) (-0.53) (1.51) 
Financing -0.257 -0.005 0.178*** 
(-0.45) (-0.04) (3.17) 
Acquisition -0.508* 0.091 0.016 
(-1.81) (0.90) (0.23) 
1/Price 0.207 0.036 
(0.65) (0.87) 
Turnover -0.021*** -0.001* 
(-3.34) (-1.87) 
Volatility 2.174*** 0.058 
(5.42) (0.94) 
Beta -0.163*** -0.009 
(-4.27) (-1.02) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Office Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,055 26,055 26,055 26,055 26,055 
R2 0.493 0.364 0.049 0.752 0.478 
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Table 10 (Cont’d): Robustness Tests 
 
Panel B: Placebo Tests 
 
  AbsDA_MJ Restatement Fraud Spread Illiquidity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
SEC_Capacity -0.072 -0.115 0.115 -0.000 0.003 
(-0.21) (-0.82) (1.49) (-0.18) (0.48) 
Size -0.220 0.163*** 0.075*** -0.001* -0.003 
(-0.36) (2.75) (4.66) (-1.94) (-0.62) 
BM -0.403 0.192 -0.141** -0.000 -0.007 
(-0.49) (1.58) (-2.05) (-0.37) (-0.67) 
Leverage 4.586*** 0.256 0.065 
(3.22) (0.83) (0.64) 
Firm_Age 0.744 -0.012* -0.004** 
(1.01) (-1.83) (-2.10) 
ROA 2.085 -0.360 -0.104 
(0.88) (-1.16) (-0.80) 
Ret 0.200 -0.005 0.065* 
(1.41) (-0.10) (1.72) 
Financing -0.247 0.050 0.146*** 
(-0.55) (0.55) (2.76) 
Acquisition -0.436** 0.106 -0.009 
(-1.99) (1.14) (-0.13) 
1/Price 0.002 0.038 
(1.02) (1.37) 
Turnover -0.000*** -0.002*** 
(-5.55) (-4.69) 
Volatility 0.309*** 2.330*** 
(11.62) (5.29) 
Beta -0.003*** -0.018** 
(-7.88) (-2.01) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Office Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 29,142 29,142 29,142 29,142 29,142 
R2 0.480 0.384 0.047 0.807 0.541 
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Table 10 (Cont’d): Robustness Tests 
 
Panel C: Excluding Financial Services Firms 
 
 
  AbsDA_MJ Restatement Fraud Spread Illiquidity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
SEC_Capacity -1.681* -0.288 -0.393*** -0.041*** -0.004*** 
(-1.66) (-1.40) (-3.34) (-4.19) (-5.58) 
Size -0.286 0.174*** 0.057*** -0.142*** -0.008* 
(-0.50) (2.74) (3.29) (-2.72) (-1.78) 
BM -0.573 0.226* -0.186** -0.032 -0.008 
(-0.74) (1.74) (-2.24) (-0.43) (-0.90) 
Leverage 4.861*** 0.247 -0.039 
(3.87) (0.74) (-0.34) 
Firm_Age 0.735 -0.014* -0.002 
(1.15) (-1.87) (-1.14) 
ROA 2.679 -0.344 0.015 
(1.28) (-1.06) (0.11) 
Ret 0.117 -0.006 0.063 
(1.04) (-0.11) (1.61) 
Financing -0.292 0.062 0.145*** 
(-0.71) (0.65) (2.58) 
Acquisition -0.403** 0.101 -0.008 
(-2.23) (1.06) (-0.11) 
1/Price 0.308 0.035 
(1.40) (1.57) 
Turnover -0.021*** -0.001** 
(-4.07) (-2.22) 
Volatility 2.160*** 0.051* 
(6.40) (1.81) 
Beta -0.168*** 0.001 
(-5.60) (0.28) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Office Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 26,712 26,712 26,712 26,712 26,712 
R2 0.477 0.384 0.049 0.774 0.594 
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